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AN INDICTMENT OF BRIGHT LINE TESTS FOR
HONEST SERVICES MAIL FRAUD
Carrie A. Tendler*
INTRODUCTION
The federal mail and wire fraud statutes have been lauded by
prosecutors as their "Stradivarius, [their] Colt 45, [their] Louisville
Slugger... [their] true love."1 Yet scholars and judges attack the
statutes, calling them "omnipotent and omnipresent"' and "broad and
amorphous criminal statutes"3 that create "a legal standard which
amounts to little more than the rhetoric of sixth grade civics classes."4
The mail fraud statute that draws such hyperbolized, dramatic
language reads, in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises... for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do,
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. This Note is dedicated to
the memory of my mother, Alice, a great educator who taught me the value and
importance of education. I wish to thank my friends and family, especially my father,
Jonathan, and my brother, Josh, for their unconditional and unending love and
support, and Professor Daniel C. Richman for his help and guidance.
1. Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 Duq. L. Rev.
771, 771 (1980). Judge Rakoff described, in full:
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our
Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true
love. We may flirt with RICO, show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy
law 'darling,' but we always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341,
with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity. It understands
us and, like many a foolish spouse, we like to think we understand it.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers,
Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in
America, 42 Duke L.J. 945,954 (1993) (describing the mail and wire fraud statutes and
finding that "[w]ith regard to the statutory weapons available to prosecutors, they
rank by analogy with hydrogen bombs on stealth aircraft").
2. Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Limiting the Limitless, Champion, Dec. 1994, at
http://www.nacdl.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/94decOl.htm.
3. Jason T. Elder, Comment, Federal Mail Fraud Unleashed: Revisiting the
Criminal Catch-All, 77 Or. L. Rev. 707,707 (1998).
4. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 142 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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places in any post office ... any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service... shall be fined.5
The statute's language may, at first glance, appear ordinary and
unlikely to generate controversy or debate; however, throughout the
1970s, the seemingly straightforward elements of the mail fraud
statute 6 became clouded by the development of the intangible rights
doctrine.7
Under the intangible rights doctrine, proof of fraud does not turn
on the acquisition of property based on false pretenses.' Rather, a
defendant is criminally liable if he deprived another of the right to the
defendant's honest and faithful services.9  This doctrine frees
prosecutors from the obligation of proving that the principal was
damaged economically.1
Assuming that some limits to the application of the intangible rights
doctrine are necessary, this Note rejects current circuit court tests as
inadequate and inconsistent with the mail fraud statute's intent. This
Note argues that a case-by-case, fact-intensive judicial analysis, in
which courts consider and weigh a series of relevant factors, is a
superior approach to the existing bright line, black letter tests to
adjudicating intangible rights cases in the private sector.
Part I provides a brief history of the mail fraud statute and the
development of the intangible rights doctrine in the private sector.1
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). The elements of the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1343, parallel those of the mail fraud statute except wire fraud requires use of an
interstate telephone call or electronic communication. Id. § 1343; see, e.g., Raphael
Rosenblatt & Adam Michaels, Mail & Wire Fraud, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 771, 773
n.16 (1997) (citing, for example, United States v. Keller, 14 F.3d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir.
1994) (describing elements of wire fraud); Mark Zingale, Note, Fashioning a Victim
Standard in Mail and Wire Fraud: Ordinarily Prudent Person or Monumentally
Credulous Gull?, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 799 (1999).
6. This Note discusses the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes interchangeably,
because they are substantially similar, and commentary and judicial decisions about
one are imputed to the other. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 199 F.3d 184, 188 (5th
Cir. 1999) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has said that because the mail and wire
fraud statutes share the same language in relevant part, the same analysis applies to
each" (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987))).
7. See, e.g., Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 142; United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th
Cir. 1973); see also Brian C. Behrens, Note, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1346: Deciphering
the Confusing Letters of the Mail Fraud Statute, 13 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 489
(1993); Peter R. Ezersky, Note, Intra-Corporate Mail and Wire Fraud: Criminal
Liability for Fiduciary Breach, 94 Yale L.J. 1427, 1429 nn.10 & 11 (1985) (collecting
pre-McNally examples applying the intangible rights doctrine in the public and
private sectors).
8. Ezersky, supra note 7, at 1430-31.
9. See, e.g., id. at 1430-31.
10. See Daniel Richman & Alan Vinegrad, 'Rybicki': The Intangible Rights
Theory of Criminal Fraud, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 12, 2004, at 4.
11. Although many issues surrounding the intangible rights doctrine arise in the
public sector, this Note focuses primarily on intangible rights issues in the private
sector. See infra note 95 for an overview of these issues.
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An examination of private sector application is especially timely in
light of recent judicial opinions 2 and the enhanced penalties provided
for in recent white-collar crime legislation. 3 Part II examines
approaches that courts currently employ to limit the statutes. Circuit
courts have been searching for, and settling on, bright line tests as a
means to limit the expansive reach of the mail fraud statute. These
tests, however, contravene important policy goals underlying the mail
fraud statute and are ineffectual in ensuring consistent application of
the intangible rights doctrine. Accordingly, Part III argues that,
assuming the scope of the mail fraud statute needs to be limited, the
most effective way to meet the policy goals of the mail fraud statute is
to abandon the bright line tests. Rather, courts should rely on various
factors that they already consider, such as materiality, self-dealing,
and affirmative misrepresentations, in conjunction with one another,
as a means of limiting the mail fraud statute to prosecutions in
appropriate instances. This Note concludes that the continuing use of
these factors, absent any court-adopted tests, limitations, or further
directions from Congress, best reflects congressional intent, preserves
the flexibility of the statute, and provides adequate notice to potential
offenders.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTANGIBLE RIGHTS DOCTRINE
This part traces the history of the mail fraud statute from its
inception to its modern form. This part discusses the development of
the honest services doctrine, focusing on two critical cases in that
development, McNally v. United States14 and United States v.
Bronston.15  Finally, this part examines Congress's recent
enhancements to the mail fraud statute and how those enhancements
have done little to remedy the controversy surrounding the intangible
rights doctrine's application in the private sector.
A. Early Statutory Development
In 1865, the Postmaster General, concerned about inappropriate
materials being sent through the mails, turned to Congress for a
solution. 6 When it became clear that the mails were being used for
12. See, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, No. 00-1043, 2003 WL 23018917 (2d Cir.
Dec. 29, 2003) (in banc) [hereinafter Rybicki II]; United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d
257 (2d Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Rybicki I]; United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2d
Cir. 2002).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(A) (2002); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 903, 116 Stat. 745, 805 (2002).
14. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
15. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981)
16. D. Fowler, Unmailable: Congress and the Post Office 57 (1977) (citing Cong.
Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 661-62, 965-66, 1256-57, 1311, 1391).
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not only obscene, but also fraudulent purposes,17 Congress enacted
the original mail fraud statute in 1872.18 This law prohibited "misusing
the post-office establishment" in furtherance of "any scheme or
artifice to defraud."19 No congressional debate, however, or other
legislative history explained the statute's purpose °.2  An 1896 Supreme
Court decision interpreting the statute21 was codified in 1909,22 when
Congress inserted the language "or for obtaining money or property
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises" after "scheme or artifice to defraud. ' 23 This amendment
reflected a shift in Congress's concern from controlling misuse of the
mails to controlling fraud more generally. 4 Over the next one
hundred years, Congress further amended the statute seven times.25
17. See Behrens, supra note 7, at 491-92.
18. The original mail fraud statute read:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or be effected by either opening or intending to open
correspondence or communication with any other person (whether resident
within or outside of the United States), by means of the post-office
establishment of the United States, or by inciting such other person to open
communication with the person so devising or intending, shall, in and for
executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting so to do), place any letter
or packet in any post-office of the United States... shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and shall be punished with a fine of not more than five
hundred dollars, with or without such imprisonment, as the court shall
direct, not exceeding eighteen calendar months. The indictment,
information, or complaint may severally charge offences to the number of
three when committed within the same six calendar months; but the court
thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion the punishment
especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office establishment
enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and device.
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
19. Id.; see also Paul Mogin, Reigning in the Mail [F/raud Statute, Champion, May
2002, at 12, 13.
20. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 779. There are, however, statements by the law's
sponsor in Congress that the statute was intended to "prevent the frauds which are
mostly gotten up in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally,
for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country." Mogin,
supra note 19, at 13 (quoting Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (statement
of Rep. Farnsworth)).
21. See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896) (holding that mail fraud
extends to "everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or
present, or suggestions and promises as to the future").
22. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130.
23. Id. Congress also removed "misusing the post-office establishment"; mailing
an item for the "purpose of executing" the scheme or artifice was sufficient. See
Mogin, supra note 19, at 13. Many detailed accounts of the early statutory
development are available, but will not be addressed here. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor,
Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. Rev. 223 (1992); Gregory Howard Williams,
Good Government by Prosecutorial Decree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32
Ariz. L. Rev. 137 (1990); Behrens, supra note 7, at 491-506.
24. Mark C. Goodman, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute: The Government's Colt
45 Renders Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom Agents of Misfortune, 10 Loy. Ent. L.J.
315, 322 (1990).
25. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873 (setting forth schemes to be
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The Supreme Court first addressed the scope of the mail fraud
statute in Durland v. United States,26 when the Court broadly
interpreted the phrase "scheme or artifice to defraud., 27 This broad
interpretation foreshadowed future mail and wire fraud
jurisprudence.28
B. The Intangible Rights Doctrine
The development of the intangible rights doctrine precipitated the
confusion and controversy surrounding the scope of mail fraud.
Despite early indications from the Supreme Court that the mail fraud
statute applied to schemes directed at causing money or property
injury,29 courts began applying the statute to schemes that threatened
"intangible rights" in the 1970s and 1980s.30 At first, the intangible
covered); Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130 (codifying the Court's
holding in Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896)); Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 763 (simplifying language); Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 34, 63
Stat. 94 (grammatical correction); Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 6(j)
(11), 84 Stat. 778 (changing "Post Office Department" to "Postal Service"); Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1346); Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act of 1994
("SCAMS"), Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXV, § 250002, 108 Stat. 2081, 2082 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2325, 2326 (1994)). All of these amendments either enlarged the scope
of the statute or made superficial changes. See, e.g., Podgor, supra note 23, at 225;
Rakoff, supra note 1, at 772.
26. 161 U.S. 306 (1896); see also Rakoff, supra note 1, at 778 (claiming "it is
obvious that the prime concern of those who commit mail fraud, those who legislate
against it, those who prosecute it, and those who judge it, is the fraud and not the
mailing").
27. Durland, 161 U.S. at 313-14 (arguing that the phrase encompassed "everything
designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and
promises as to the future"); see also Behrens, supra note 7, at 495 (noting that in
Durland, the Court "went beyond the meaning attributed to common law fraud.., to
cover the rampant frauds that were now using the mails"); Geraldine Szott Moohr,
An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime,
55 Fla. L. Rev. 937, 944 (2003) ("Mail fraud is written broadly, and has been
expansively interpreted, so that the offense now encompasses an extraordinarily wide
range of deceptive conduct.").
28. See, e.g., Podgor, supra note 23, at 232 & nn.61-62 (listing cases demonstrating
the "full bloom" of the intangible rights doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s).
29. See Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188-89 (1924) (involving
the general federal conspiracy statute); see also Behrens, supra note 7, at 506 ("It has
been relatively clear since its enactment that the mail fraud statute could be applied in
situations where victims were deprived out of their money or property .... ).
30. The intangible rights doctrine, in its "pre-McNally form" did not come into
existence until about 1973. Jeffrey J. Dean & Doye E. Green, Jr., McNally v. United
States and its Effect on the Federal Mail Fraud Statute: Will White Collar Criminals
Get a Break?, 39 Mercer L. Rev. 697, 703 (1988). The category of intangible rights
was broad from its inception and "seemed to be limited only by prosecutors'
imagination." Mogin, supra note 19, at 13. Mogin stated that:
It expanded to include such diverse rights as the right to conscientious, loyal,
faithful, disinterested and honest government, a state motor vehicle
department's right to have its driver's-license program administered free
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rights doctrine developed primarily in the public sector.31 In the public
sector, prosecutors typically used the mail fraud statute to prosecute
either bribery of a public official or the failure of the public official to
disclose information regarding a personal interest potentially affecting
his judgment.32 Thus undisclosed, biased decision making or misuse of
government position for personal gain constituted a deprivation of
honest services,33 regardless of tangible harm to the public.34
In the private sector, these intangible rights included an employer's
or other principal's right to the honest services of its employees or
agents.35 Intangible rights in the private sector also included rights
unconnected to any special duty and where the victim suffered no
actual economic loss, such as the right to privacy and the right to
"time, effort, money, and expectations. 3 6  According to one
commentator, this "exotic flower.., quickly overgrew the legal
landscape in the manner of the kudzu vine until... few ethical or
fiduciary breaches seemed beyond its potential reach."37  As
prosecutors shifted their attention from protecting the integrity of the
mails to white collar crime,38 the mail fraud statute became "a
strategic tool in fighting political corruption and increasingly
sophisticated economic misconduct. ' 39 The scheme's relationship to
the mails, if any, became increasingly less important.40 Accompanying
from falsehood, a private employer's right to the honest services of his
employee, and an electoral body's political rights to fair elections.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
31. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and
Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875, 1879 (1992);
see also United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir.
1973); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding that a scheme
involving the corruption of a public official is a fraud) (overruled on other grounds);
United States v. Classic, 35 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. La. 1940) (holding that a "scheme to
defraud" includes the deprivation of the intangible right of good government when
election commissioner committed fraud).
32. Nirav Shah, Mail and Wire Fraud, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 825, 834 (2003).
33. See Podgor, supra note 23, at 233 ("Prosecutors indicted and convicted public
officials pursuant to the intangible rights doctrine with a finding that they had
deprived the citizenry of the right to good government.").
34. See id.; see also United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1283 n.30 (11th Cir.
1996) (collecting cases).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Silvano, 812 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v.
Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1985).
36. John E. Gagliardi, Back to the Future: Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Under 18
U.S.C. § 1346, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 901, 907 (1993) (citations omitted).
37. John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private
Distinction, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 427,427 (1998).
38. See Podgor, supra note 23, at 224 ("Although a 'mailing' is still necessary to
procure a mail fraud conviction, the emphasis of the offense has shifted, drastically
reducing the focus on the use of the postal system.").
39. Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The
Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 435,438 (1995).
40. See, e.g., id.; Behrens, supra note 7, at 490 (noting that the use of mails is no
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the intangible rights doctrine's expansion was criticism from judges,
which signaled their discontent with the statute's potential reach.41
Criticism of the intangible rights doctrine and its reach in the private
sector was especially sharp by academics. 2
The intangible rights doctrine reached its "high water mark ' 43 in
1981, when the Second Circuit upheld a mail fraud conviction in
United States v. Bronston.4 There, the defendant was a partner at a
law firm, Rosenman, Colin, Freund, Lewis, & Cohen ("Rosenman
Colin").45  Rosenman Colin represented two venture capital
companies investing in BusTop Shelters, Inc. ("BusTop"). 46  At
approximately the same time, a personal client of the defendant
("C&S") approached the defendant seeking representation in his own
efforts to acquire BusTop.47 The defendant's firm declined the
representation because of the perceived conflicts with Rosenman
Colin's representation of the BusTop minority shareholders.48
Despite the firm's refusal, the defendant secretly began representing
C&S, ultimately billing them $12,500, which he never shared with his
partners. 9  There was no evidence that the defendant ever
longer an important requirement and today, only requires a "minute link" to the mail
system).
41. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 502 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan, Blackmun & Powell, J.J., dissenting) (criticizing the lower courts
for allowing "extraordinary expansion" of §§ 1341 and 1343 "to permit federal
prosecution for conduct that some had thought was subject only to state criminal and
civil law" (internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 309
(7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) (criticizing the fundamental honesty and fair play
formulation of the statute as "much too broad"); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d
108. 141 n.4, 142 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(protesting extension of the mail fraud statute by "judicial fiat").
42. For an extensive critique of intangible rights and the private sector, see John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the "Evolution"
of a White Collar Crime, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee,
Metastasis]; John C. Coffee Jr., The Great Mail Fraud Flip-Flop: From Intangible
Rights to Intangible Property, White-Collar Crime Rep., May 1988, at 1, 2
(categorizing the mail fraud statute as a "serious overextension of federal criminal
law"); Ezersky, supra note 7, at 1438-39 (arguing that "[j]udicial policing of loyalty, if
worthwhile at all, ought not to be done in criminal cases, where the consequences of
the inevitable failures of judgment are severe"); Williams, supra note 23; Daniel J.
Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Approach, 20 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 423, 436 (1983) (advocating some restraint on the "virtually unbridled
discretion prosecutors have been allowed in utilizing this statute"); see also Podgor,
supra note 2 (referring to § 1346 as a "ridiculous provision that needs to be repealed"
and accusing Congress of failing to define honest services, leaving a doctrine that can
result in "arbitrary and discriminatory application").
43. See Coffee, supra note 37, at 432-33.
44. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 922.
46. Id. Rosenman Colin did not otherwise represent BusTop. Id.
47. Id. at 922.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 922-23, 925.
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misappropriated confidential information of BusTop. 0  Yet, the
Second Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction on an intangible
rights theory.5
Academics consistently use Bronston as a high water mark case in
the development of the honest services doctrine. The facts of
Bronston indicate that any lack of candor or good faith to a former
client, who had been represented in a one-time transaction, violates
the mail fraud statute.53 This is significant because the court upheld a
finding of criminal liability even though there was no actual misuse of
a fiduciary duty beyond the mere presence of conflict.54 Since there
was no actual misuse of the fiduciary duty or unfair self-dealing, only
the fact of a knowing conflict, the Bronston court implicitly rejected
any requirement of actual or intended harm." Under this view,
Bronston marked the beginning of a "slippery slope, 56 of cases that
essentially established a new crime-corporate impropriety.5 7
C. McNally and the Legislative Aftermath
McNally v. United States5 represents a major turning point in the
development of the honest services doctrine, to which Congress
responded with legislation that codified intangible rights. In
McNally,59 the Supreme Court sought to put an end to the unchecked
expansion of the mail fraud statute.6" The McNally Court rejected the
50. Id. at 926; Coffee, supra note 37, at 433.
51. Bronston, 658 F.2d at 926-30.
52. See Coffee, supra note 37, at 432-34; see also Richman & Vinegrad, supra note
10.
53. Coffee, supra note 37, at 433.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 434. Coffee argued:
Bronston thus crossed a critical threshold: before it, cases in which there was
only a conflict of interests, but neither a transaction between the fiduciary
and the client, nor any misappropriation of information or property by the
fiduciary from the client, had been considered merely "constructive fraud,"
which did not amount to the type of "actual fraud" that transgressed the
federal mail and wire fraud statutes.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 434 n.35 (citing United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 24 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Winter, J., dissenting)). The decision upheld the conviction of corporate officials for
mail fraud on an honest services theory where they had taken actions intended to
benefit the firm but had not adequately disclosed those actions to the board or
shareholders. Siegel, 717 F.2d at 22-23. Judge Winter, in dissent, argued that, "[i]n
effect, a new crime--corporate improprieties-which entails neither fraud nor even a
victim, has been created." Id. at 24.
58. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
59. Id. McNally involved three defendants, a chairman of the state Democratic
Party, a former Kentucky state official, and McNally, who devised a scheme to share
commissions on Kentucky's workers compensation insurance policies. Id. at 352-53.
The defendants were prosecuted on a theory that they deprived the citizens of
Kentucky of their right to good government. Id.
60. Id. at 359-60.
2004] BRIGHT LINE TESTS & MAIL FRAUD 2737
intangible rights doctrine, holding that the "mail fraud statute clearly
protects property rights, but does not refer to the intangible right of
the citizenry to good government.... [T]he original impetus behind
the mail fraud statute was to protect the people from schemes to
deprive them of their money or property."61 The Court, limiting the
application of the mail fraud statute to the deprivation of some money
or property, reversed a conviction of a public official based on an
honest services theory in which the prosecutors failed to allege a
deprivation of money or property.62 The Court invited Congress to
speak more clearly on the issue if it sought to protect intangible
rights.63 Congress eventually responded.'
Six months later, the Court clarified its McNally holding in
Carpenter v. United States.65 There, the Court held that the coverage
of the mail fraud statute extends to both tangible and intangible
property rights.66 Despite this clarification, the McNally decision
endured criticism.67
In direct response to McNally, Congress passed an omnibus drug
bill,68 including a provision now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1346.69 There
61. Id. at 356. The Court found that the mail fraud statute is "limited in scope to
the protection of property rights." Id. at 360.
62. Id. at 358-61. For a more expansive discussion of McNally, see Thomas Brom,
Expanded Mail Fraud a Dead Letter, Cal. Law., Oct. 1987, at 11; Dean & Green,
supra note 30; Mogin, supra note 19, at 13-14; Podgor, supra note 23, at 233-34; Paul
W. Barnett, Note, McNally v. United States: Mail Fraud-The Procrustean Bed
Couldn't Stretch this One, 48 La. L. Rev. 723 (1988); Behrens, supra note 7, at 509-11;
Donna Metcalfe Ducey, Note, McNally v. United States: The Demise of the
Intangible Rights Doctrine, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 1035 (1988).
63. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 360 (stating that "[i]f Congress desires to go further,
it must speak more clearly than it has").
64. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
65. 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (upholding the conviction of a Wall Street Journal reporter
who had disclosed financial information obtained in course of his business to investors
who traded on that information before its release in the Journal). This holding
essentially reinforced McNally, requiring that the government prove a deprivation of
money or property, but accounted for both tangible and intangible property. See
Podgor, supra note 23, at 235.
66. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27-28. The Court held that the mail fraud statute does
not require a showing of actual loss or injury when, as here, the victim was deprived
of exclusive use of information. Id. Thus the Court recognized that there was such a
thing as intangible property, such as confidential information or trade secrets, but
distinguished this from the concept of intangible rights, like those to honest services.
Id.
67. See Dean & Green, supra note 30, at 912-15; Ducey, supra note 62, at 1049-50
(arguing that the public will suffer the greatest loss under McNally, and encouraging
Congress to amend the mail fraud statute, as the McNally decision "immunized an
entire group of criminals from prosecution").
68. This bill was called the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102
Stat. 4181.
69. Sec. 7603, 102 Stat. at 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346). The section reads:
"For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 18
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is limited legislative history7" on the intent of § 1346.71 In fact, the only
legislative history is the record of remarks on the floor of the House
by the sponsor of the amendment, Representative John Conyers.
After describing McNally and its effect on various circuits,
Representative Conyers stated that § 1346 was intended to overturn
McNally and restore the reach of the mail and wire fraud provisions to
their pre-McNally limits.7 2
D. Recent Enhancements
Section 1346 proved not to be Congress's final word on the reach of
the mail fraud statute, and recent legislative enhancements have done
little to resolve the controversy surrounding it.73 Congress expanded
the statute again in 1994 when it passed the Senior Citizens Against
Marketing Scams Act ("SCAMS Act"),74 legislation designed to
combat telemarketing ploys directed at the elderly.75 The SCAMS
Act amended the mail fraud statute to cover not only U.S. Postal
Service communications, but also communications sent by private
U.S.C. § 1346 (2000). This section applies to both the mail and wire fraud statutes.
See id.
70. See infra Part III.D. for a more complete discussion of the available legislative
history.
71. As Judges Jolly and DeMoss described in United States v. Brumley:
The specific text of what has become 18 U.S.C. § 1346 was inserted in the
Omnibus Drug Bill for the first time on the very day that the Omnibus Drug
Bill was finally passed by both the House and the Senate. The text of what is
now section 1346 was never included in any bill as filed in either the House
of Representatives or the Senate. As a result, the text of section 1346 was
never referred to any committee of either the House or the Senate, was
never the subject of any committee report from either the House or the
Senate, and was never the subject of any floor debate reported in the
Congressional Record.
116 F.3d 728, 742 (5th Cir. 1997) (in banc) (Jolly & DeMoss, J.J., dissenting).
72. 134 Cong. Rec. H11108, H11251 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Conyers). Representative Conyers stated:
This amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where that provision
was before the McNally decision. The amendment also applies to the wire
fraud provision, and precludes the McNally result with regard to that
provision. The amendment adds a new section to 18 U.S.C. [chapter] 63 that
defines the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' to include a scheme or
artifice to defraud another of 'the intangible right of honest services.' Thus,
it is no longer necessary to determine whether or not the scheme or artifice
to defraud involved money or property. This amendment is intended merely
to overturn the McNally decision. No other change in the law is intended.
Id.
73. See, e.g., SCAMS Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087
(1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §
903, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 805.
74. SCAMS Act, § 250006, 108 Stat. at 2087.
75. Id.
2004] BRIGHT LINE TESTS & MAIL FRAUD 2739
interstate commercial carriers, such as FedEx and UPS.76
Furthermore, the statute enhanced penalties for mail and wire fraud
convictions targeted at individuals over the age of fifty-five. 7  These
enhancements seemed to indicate that Congress had no serious
objection to the reach of the mail fraud doctrine as courts had applied
it.
78
A complete discussion of the history of the mail and wire fraud
provisions would not be complete without noting the implications of
the statute under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 79 and examining the mail
fraud statute's use as a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act ("RICO") 80 predicate act.81 The White Collar
Crime Penalty Enhancement Act ("WCCPA"), part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 2 increased the maximum sentence for mail and wire fraud
from five to twenty years.83 In addition, mail and wire fraud are two
predicate acts for civil RICO actions,84 carrying with them treble
damages and attorney's fees provisions."
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 198986 ("FIRREA") also increased penalties for mail fraud,
increasing the penalty to a maximum fine of $1 million and up to
thirty years in prison when the fraud relates to a financial institution.87
76. Id.; see also Anne S. Dudley & Daniel F. Schubert, Mail and Wire Fraud, 38
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1025, 1027-29 (2001).
77. Dudley & Schubert, supra note 76, at 1028.
78. See Moohr, supra note 27, at 945 (noting that as a "testament" to the
effectiveness of the mail and wire fraud statutes, Congress did not alter mail fraud's
substantive elements with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
79. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903, 116 Stat. 804.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000). RICO prohibits the receipt of income from a pattern
of racketeering, which requires two predicate acts of racketeering. Id. § 1961(5). Both
mail fraud and wire fraud can qualify as racketeering predicate acts. Id. § 1961 (1)(B).
81. Id. § 1961; see United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that mailing fraudulent tax returns is a predicate act under RICO because such
mailing is indictable under mail fraud).
82. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903, 116 Stat. at 805
(amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343).
83. Id.
84. According to Ellen S. Podgor, "[t]he expansiveness of the mail fraud statute
has resulted in 'garden variety frauds' being alleged in civil RICO actions." Podgor,
supra note 2 (citing Susan Getzendanner, Judicial 'Pruning' of 'Garden Variety Fraud'
Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 Vand. L. Rev.
673, 679 (1990)).
85. Lee Applebaum, Is There a Good Faith Claim for the RICO Enterprise
Plaintiff?, 27 Del. J. Corp. L. 519, 521 (2002). Applebaum argues that it is through the
mail and wire fraud statutes that "'garden variety' common law fraud claims are said
to be turned into federal treble damages suits." Id. Applebaum further argues that
RICO has "achieved an unimagined level of use against legitimate individuals and
businesses in the civil litigation context." Id. at 519.
86. Act of Aug. 9, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 961(i), 103 Stat. 183, 500. The
Crime Control Act amended the maximum prison term to thirty years.
87. Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2504(h), 104 Stat. 7989, 4861.
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Therefore, the scope of mail fraud has serious criminal and civil
repercussions for private individuals and businesses alike.88
If the mail fraud statute's history makes anything clear, it is that
Congress's enactment of § 1346, codifying the honest services
doctrine, and subsequent legislation, reflects a continuing desire to
preserve the mail fraud statute as a potent weapon in a prosecutor's
arsenal. The Supreme Court's attempt at demanding limits on the
reach of the mail fraud statute in McNally fell victim to the legislative
process, leaving lower courts around the country with the
responsibility of determining the mail fraud statute's proper scope.
II. A SEARCH FOR LIMITS: CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES TO
LIMITING MAIL FRAUD HONEST SERVICES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Part II begins by discussing the relevance of a focus on the private,
as opposed to public, sector in the discussion of the honest services
doctrine. Part II.A. discusses the various approaches taken by circuit
courts in their attempts to limit the honest services doctrine in the
private sector. Part II.B. focuses on two recent Second Circuit cases
that highlight the tension among the circuits on the proper limits to
the mail fraud statute.
With so little guidance from Congress,89 the responsibility for
determining the scope of § 1346 in the private sector has fallen to the
judiciary.9" At first glance, circuits seem to be split on the best way to
limit the statute's application in the private sector.91 Why should
honest services fraud be limited in the private sector? As the Sixth
Circuit noted in United States v. Frost, the "literal terms [of § 1346]
suggest that dishonesty by an employee, standing alone, is a crime."'92
The Sixth Circuit is not alone in its refusal to interpret § 1346 that
88. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2504(h), 104 Stat. at
4861.
89. Expounding on this lack of guidance, John Coffee noted that "[t]he contours
of this 'intangible right' theory have always been uncertain, in part because the
governing standard was the ineffable principle of 'fair play."' John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193, 202-03 (1991); see also Ellen S.
Podgor, Mail Fraud: Redefining the Boundaries, 10 St. Thomas L. Rev. 557, 562
(1998) ("A deprivation of the 'intangible right of honest services' could easily include
a wealth of nefarious conduct if not constrained by the judiciary.").
90. See Gagliardi, supra note 36, at 915; Christopher Q. Cutler, Note, McNally
Revisited: The "Misrepresentation Branch" of the Mail Fraud Statute a Decade Later,
13 BYU J. Pub. L. 77, 88-89 (1998) ("In the decade since McNally, a multitude of
courts have played the judicial soothsayer, attempting to divine from the cryptic
harbingers of the high Court and the Congress what fate has befallen the mail fraud
statute.").
91. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 37. Entitling a section of his article "The
Available Options: An Inventory," Coffee discusses various approaches taken by
different circuits in mail and wire fraud cases. Id. at 449-59.
92. United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997).
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broadly.93 The pervasive reason justifying the court's attempts to limit
the reach of § 1346, at least as applied to private actors, is a general
fear of over-criminalization in the commercial setting.94
Moreover, there are different policy concerns and reasons for limits
when the honest services doctrine is applied in the private sector than
when it is applied in the public sector.95 Inherent in the role of a
public official is the duty to make decisions based on the public's best
interest, not profitable self-dealing.96 An honest services prosecution
is appropriately applied in the public sector because, "[i]n a
democracy, citizens elect public officials to act for the common good.
When official action is corrupted by secret bribes or kickbacks, the
essence of the political contract is violated."97 On the other hand,
some courts explain the differences in the private sector, arguing that
such a strict duty of loyalty is not ordinarily found in private sector
relationships. 98 Even when they do exist, the nature of loyalty and
fidelity in the private sector differs in kind from the public sector
obligation.99 This distinction also bears heavily on the problem of fair
93. See infra Part II.A. for a discussion of the circuit approaches to limiting the
scope of § 1346; see also Podgor, supra note 89, at 560-68 & nn.55-99 (collecting
cases).
94. See United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 667 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that
"where a private actor or quasi-private actor is deprived of honest services in the
context of a commercial transaction, it would give us great pause if a right to honest
services is violated by every breach of contract or every misstatement made in the
course of dealing"); John C. Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the
Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and
Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117, 167 (1981). Coffee notes, "if merely depriving the
victim of the loyalty and faithful service of his fiduciary constitutes criminal [mail]
fraud, the ends/means distinction is lost. Once the ends/means distinction is abolished
and disloyalty alone becomes the crime, little remains before every civil wrong is
potentially indictable." Id.
95. See Coffee, supra note 37, at 461-63 (citing differing concerns about fair
notice, overlapping statutory duties, judicial monitoring, relative harm, and selective
enforcement in arguing that the mail fraud statute should be applied more
aggressively in the public context than in the private context); see also Frost, 125 F.3d
at 365 (arguing that enforcement of an intangible right to honest services has a much
weaker justification in the private sector than in the public sector because
"relationships in the private sector generally rest upon concerns and expectations less
ethereal and more economic than the abstract satisfaction of receiving 'honest
services' for their own sake").
96. See United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999) ("'If the
official instead secretly makes his decision based on his own personal interests-as
when an official accepts a bribe or personally benefits from an undisclosed conflict of
interest-the official has defrauded the public of his honest services."' (quoting
United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169 (1lth Cir. 1997))).
97. United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996).
98. See deVegter, 198 F.3d at 1328.
99. Id. The court went on to explain this difference:
"[E]mployee loyalty is not an end in itself, it is a means to obtain and
preserve pecuniary benefits for the employer. An employee's undisclosed
conflict of interest does not by itself necessarily pose the threat of economic
harm to the employer."... A public official's undisclosed conflict of
2742 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
notice." ° The expectation that public officials hold power "in trust for
the citizenry" is ingrained in our democratic culture, and thus no
surprise should come when the criminal law seeks to enforce these
expectations. 101 The same premise is not as easily applied to private
actors, who in many instances, are entitled to work towards and for
the benefit of their own self-interest. 1 2 The difficulty in applying the
honest services doctrine in the private sector has resulted in differing
circuit court approaches to defining the mail fraud statute's scope.
A. Circuit Court Approaches
Each circuit that has considered the scope of § 1346 in the private
sector essentially has agreed on the need for limits, but there is little
agreement on what these limits should be.0 3 Courts have framed the
reach of honest services fraud in the private sector as the subject of a
decisive circuit split."° For example, the Fourth Circuit, in United
States v. Vinyard,105 explicitly framed the analysis as one in which "[its]
sister circuits ... have split over the proper approach,"'01 6 identifying
the two competing approaches as the reasonably foreseeable harm
interest, in contrast, does by itself harm the constituents' interest in the end
for which the official serves-honest government in the public's best
interest. The "intangible right of honest services" must be given an
analogous interpretation in the private sector. Therefore, for a private sector
defendant to have violated the victim's right to honest services, it is not
enough to prove the defendant's breach of loyalty alone. Rather, as is always
true in a breach of loyalty by a public official, the breach of loyalty by a
private sector defendant must in each case contravene-by inherently
harming-the purpose of the parties' relationship.
Id. at 1528-39 (quoting United States v. Lemire, 720 F.3d 1327, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
100. See id. at 1329.
101. Coffee, supra note 37, at 461.
102. See id.; Ezersky, supra note 7, at 1437-38 (noting that almost all decisions
made by managers can be construed as self-interested).
103. See, e.g., Rybicki H, No. 00-1043, 2003 WL 23018917 (2d. Cir. Dec. 29, 2003)
(in banc) (adopting the materiality test); Rybicki I, 287 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2002)
(adopting a reasonably foreseeable harm test with a de minimis harm requirement);
United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002) (drawing a distinction between
a duty enforceable in tort and a duty enforceable in contract); United States v.
Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 327-29 (4th Cir. 2001) (adopting the reasonably foreseeable
harm test), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002); United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 17
(1st Cir. 2000) (adopting a reasonably foreseeable harm test); deVegter, 198 F.3d at
1328-30 (adopting a reasonably foreseeable harm test); United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 973-74 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (adopting a reasonably
foreseeable harm test); United States v. Jordan, 112 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1997)
(requiring the government to prove some articulable harm to the victim or some
intended gain to the defendant).
104. The Second Circuit commented that "the [intangible rights] doctrine grew in
an 'uneven' way, case-by-case and circuit-by-circuit; and court after court warned of
the prosecutorial abuse." Handakas, 286 F.3d at 102; see Behrens, supra note 7, at 525
(calling for more uniformity among the courts).
105. 266 F.3d at 327-29.
106. Id.
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test and the materiality test." 7 The reasonably foreseeable harm test
requires the government to prove "'that the employee intended to
breach a fiduciary duty, and that the employee foresaw or reasonably
should have foreseen that his employer might suffer an economic
harm as a result of the breach.""0 8 The materiality test requires the
government to show that the employee "possessed a fraudulent intent
and that the misrepresentation at issue was material."'"
Various courts have simultaneously employed these, and other,
approaches to analyzing private sector mail fraud cases.10 These
courts consistently frame the analyses in light of these supposedly
divergent approaches."' At times, the First Circuit has required the
government to prove that the deprivation of honest services either
resulted in some articulable harm to the victim or was intended for
some gainful use to the defendant."2 In another "test," the court asks
"whether the receipt of a side payment, or the failure to disclose a
conflict, necessarily results in a deprivation of honest services."'1 3 The
court answered that "if the defendant employee has performed the
same services.., that a totally honest employee would have provided,
there has been no deprivation of honest services." '114 Another
approach, unique to the Fifth Circuit, was set forth in United States v.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 327 (quoting United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)).
This test has been adopted by other circuits, in their quest for bright line limits on the
reach of § 1346. See, e.g., id. at 327-29; Martin, 228 F.3d at 17; deVegter, 198 F.3d at
1328-31; Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d at 973-74; Frost, 125 F.3d at 368-69; United
States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441-42 (8th Cir. 1996).
109. Vinyard, 266 F.3d at 327. The court defined materiality as "'any
misrepresentation that has the natural tendency to influence or is capable of
influencing' the employer to change his behavior." Id. at 328 (internal citations and
quotations omitted). The Restatement (Second) of Torts instructs that a matter is
material if:
a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or the
maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient
regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his
choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538.
The Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits adopted the materiality test. See, e.g.,
Rybicki 11, 2003 WL 23018917, at *15; United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 665
(10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 774-75 (5th Cir. 1996).
110. See supra note 103.
111. See supra note 103.
112. See United States v. Jordan, 112 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.
Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1077 (1st Cir. 1997). It should be noted that Czubinski was a
public sector case.
113. Coffee, supra note 37, at 451.
114. Id. at 452.
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Brumley,"5 where the court held that there must be an underlying
violation of state law to justify a mail fraud prosecution.116
The Supreme Court weighed in once more on the subject of
intangible rights in Neder v. United States.'17 The Court directly
addressed the question of whether materiality is an element of the
federal mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes. 8 Because both at the
time of the mail fraud statute's original enactment and the later
enactment of the wire fraud statute, "fraud" required a
"misrepresentation or concealment of material fact,"'1 9 Congress
presumably intended to incorporate that meaning.12° The Court held,
therefore, that "materiality of falsehood is an element of the
federal ... fraud statutes." '121 Subsequently, courts continued to adopt
the reasonably foreseeable harm test, indicating that the materiality
standard imposed a minimum limit on the reach of mail fraud, but not
an exhaustive one.
B. The Second Circuit: Handakas and Rybicki
These seemingly divergent approaches to determining the scope of
honest services mail fraud in the private sector have collided in the
Second Circuit in a pair of decisions, 122 United States v. Handakas
1 2 3
and United States v. Rybicki,124 which highlight the problems in the
judiciary's quest for a bright line test. The Second Circuit's 2-1
decision in Handakas held, for the first time anywhere, that § 1346
was unconstitutionally vague as applied.1 25 Defendant Handakas was
convicted of, inter alia, various counts of mail fraud for failing to pay
the prevailing rate of wages to his employees as required by both state
law, and by the terms of a series of construction contracts that
115. 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997).
116. Brumley was a public sector case, and its application to the private sector is
unclear, especially because the court left open the question of whether the underlying
breach had to be a violation of state criminal law. The Fifth Circuit did not reach the
question, but the distinction is critical. See Coffee, supra note 37, at 452-54. As John
Coffee Jr. pointed out, a limitation to state criminal law violations would
"emasculate" § 1346. Id. at 452. If § 1346 is read, however, "to recognize the violation
of... [a] common law norm... , then the ... statutes would continue to reach most
private fiduciary breaches." Id. at 452-53.
117. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id. at 22.
120. Id. at 23.
121. Id. at 25.
122. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2002), and Rybicki I, 287 F.3d 257 (2000), have been
trumpeted as "perhaps the two most significant honest services cases in the Second
Circuit since § 1346 was enacted 14 years ago." Richard M. Strassberg & Roberto M.
Braceras, Circuit Court Grapples with "Honest Services" Fraud (September 2003), at
http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/file/00338/008596.
123. 286 F.3d at 92.
124. 287 F.3d at 257.
125. Handakas, 286 F.3d at 112.
2744 [Vol. 72
2004] BRIGHT LINE TESTS & MAIL FRA UD 2745
Handakas's company had entered into with the New York City School
Construction Authority ("SCA").2 6 The court concluded that by
falsifying his payroll records, Handakas deprived SCA of its right to
his honest services.1
27
On appeal, the Second Circuit expressed serious concern about the
amorphous nature of the term "honest services" and indicated that
were it not bound by precedent, the court would "likely find [the
honest services language of § 1346] so vague as to be unconstitutional
on its face. 1 2' The court distinguished Handakas from prior honest
services cases in the Second Circuit 29 because here, the defendant's
breaches would not be enforceable by an action in tort.1 30 Rather, the
court found "no principled distinction between the duties breached by
Handakas and the garden-variety contractual duties usually collected
under the rubric of 'representations and warranties. ' '131 This was a
126. Id. at 96.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 104 (arguing that the plain meaning of § 1346's honest services language
"simply provides no clue to the public or the courts as to what conduct is prohibited
under the statute").
129. The two major cases in the Second Circuit prior to Handakas were United
States v. Middlemiss, 217 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2000), and United States v. Sancho, 157 F.3d
918 (2d Cir. 1998), overruled by Rybicki II, No. 00-1043, 2003 WL 23018917 (2d Cir.
Dec. 29, 2003). In Sancho, a construction company ("TCC") contacted Sancho, who
claimed to be a real estate developer. 157 F.3d at 919. Tishman, the President of
TCC, expressed interest in being the construction manager for Sancho's project. Id.
Sancho offered TCC the job, and they engaged in extensive contract negotiations. Id.
During these negotiations, the FBI approached Tishman and informed him that they
were investigating Sancho in an unrelated matter, and they set up an undercover
agent posing as a financial consultant hired by TCC to perform due diligence. Id. At
their first meeting, Sancho proposed that TCC provide a $500 million letter of credit
that Sancho would place in an investment program operated by a company called
Equidev. Id. The agent investigated Equidev and reported back to Sancho that
Equidev was a fraud. The undercover agent further advised that he would conceal
this from TCC and advise it to proceed if Sancho paid him $1.25 million. Id. Sancho
agreed, devised a scheme to conceal the payments, and then challenged his honest
services mail fraud conviction on the grounds that neither he nor the agent had a
genuine fiduciary relationship with TCC. Id. at 919-20. The court rejected this claim,
holding that a genuine fiduciary relationship was not required. Id. at 920-21. The
Handakas court noted that the cases relied upon in the Sancho decision all involved a
duty of disclosure enforceable in tort. Handakas, 286 F.3d at 106.
A similar duty of disclosure was the basis for the Middlemiss's mail fraud
conviction, where the defendant had deprived his employer of "all the services that a
totally faithful employee would have provided." Middlemiss, 217 F.3d at 120. There,
the defendant also acted contrary to the best interest of his employer when a
company seeking a food-concession license at the offices of a public authority
conveyed a secret corporate interest to the defendant. Id. at 115-16, 120. The court, in
Handakas, read the Sancho and Middlemiss decisions together as standing for the
proposition that "a scheme to harm another by the breach of a duty enforceable by an
action in tort may support a conviction for a scheme to defraud another of 'honest
services.' Handakas, 286 F.3d at 106.
130. Handakas, 286 F.3d at 106.
131. Id. at 106-07.
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dispositive distinction for the court, and it was this limit that had an
immediate impact on the scope of future § 1346 decisions. 132
In Rybicki I, a decision issued less then five weeks after Handakas,
a different panel of the Second Circuit defined the scope of conduct,
in light of Handakas, that would justify a conviction under § 1346.133
The court acknowledged and purported to accept the holding in
Handakas,114 but refused to find § 1346 unconstitutional as applied to
the defendants in the case before them, apparently because the
conduct in Rybicki 1135 involved "the breach of a duty owed by an
employee or agent to his employer or principal that was enforceable
by an action at tort.' 13 6 The Court did, however, reinforce many of
the same concerns that the Handakas panel expressed about the
vagueness of § 1346.1"' After analyzing the different approaches, such
as the materiality and reasonably foreseeable harm tests, that other
circuits have taken to limit the honest services doctrine, the Second
Circuit held that:
the elements necessary to establish the offense of honest services
fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1346 are: (1) a scheme or artifice to
defraud; (2) for the purpose of depriving another of the intangible
right of honest services; (3) where it is reasonably foreseeable that
the scheme could cause some economic or pecuniary harm to the
victim that is more than de minimis; and (4) use of the mails or wires
in furtherance of the scheme. 138
The Second Circuit thus concluded that this test provides the
necessary limits on what is otherwise "so boundless a concept. 139
The standards laid out in Rybicki I, like the "tests" that other
circuits have employed, possess fundamental problems. 4 ° Despite the
Second Circuit's contention that the Rybicki I standards addressed the
vagueness concerns pervading the honest services doctrine, many of
these concerns raised in Handakas remain unaddressed. 4' In fact,
even more vagueness problems seem to be created by the Second
Circuit's de minimis requirement.142 The distinction between a duty
132. Strassberg & Braceras, supra note 122.
133. Id.
134. See Rybicki 1, 287 F.3d 257, 263-64 (2d Cir. 2002). There does, however,
remain an inherent tension between the two decisions. See Richman & Vinegrad,
supra note 10.
135. The defendants were personal injury lawyers who used intermediaries to
funnel money to insurance adjusters to obtain more favorable settlements for their
clients. The defendants and the others involved took extensive steps to conceal the
payments. Rybicki 1, 287 F.3d at 260.
136. Id. at 264.
137. Id. (noting that "the potential reach of § 1346 is virtually limitless").
138. Id. at 266.
139. Id. at 265.
140. See Strassberg & Braceras, supra note 122.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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enforceable by tort and a duty enforceable by contract is "malleable at
best. 1 43 Moreover, what constitutes de minimis harm will vary from
circuit to circuit. In addition, both the reasonably foreseeable harm
requirement and the exclusion of de minimis violations seem to be
without foundation in either the language of § 1346 or the legislative
history of the statute. 44
The Second Circuit itself revisited the Rybicki I decision in an in
banc hearing to determine whether § 1346 was unconstitutionally
143. Id.; see also Brief of the United States at 53-54, Rybicki H, No. 00-1043, 2003
WL 23018917 (2d Cir. Dec. 29, 2003) (in banc) [hereinafter Government's Brief]. The
tort-contract distinction is an unprecedented one, and the Government properly
questioned the wisdom of such a distinction and discussed why such a distinction is
unnecessary to prevent the misuse of § 1346. See id. The distinction is also arbitrary.
See id. An employee breaching a contract that expressly prohibited him from
profiting from his discretionary decisions and required him to disclose such interests
could not be prosecuted, whereas an employee without such a contract could be. Id.
The government then proposed a more logical distinction--excluding "breaches of
arms-length contracts that do not create fiduciary or agency relationships." Id. at 54.
This limit would prohibit prosecution for ordinary breaches of commercial contracts
without excluding cases involving fiduciary or agency relationships only because they
arise from a contract. Id. Although this Note does not endorse any one bright line
rule, the same effect is achieved by this Note's ultimate proposal. See infra Part III.
144. See Government's Brief at 54, Rybicki II (No. 00-1043); see also infra Part
III.D. and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of § 1346). The Second
Circuit reheard Rybicki in banc, and in the government's brief for that hearing, the
government specifically questioned the "wisdom or utility of the 'more than de
minimis' requirement." Government's Brief at 51, Rybicki II (No. 00-1043).
Suggesting this requirement would create more uncertainty in the future, the
government noted that there is no value threshold for § 1341 or § 1343, only a
requirement that the jurisdictional predicates be met. Id. The government directly
addressed the panel's conclusion that the de minimis requirement was necessary. Id.
In justifying the de minimis requirement, the panel discussed a hypothetical case that
the court sought to exclude from the purview of § 1346, the instance where an
employee violated a company policy by giving her employer's telephone access code
to a customer to make a long distance phone call. Rybicki 1, 287 F.3d at 264. The
government pointed out that a de minimis exception is "neither necessary nor
sufficient" to prevent prosecution in that case. Government's Brief at 52, Rybicki II
(No. 00-1043). Prosecution could be pursued as a traditional money or property wire
fraud case, since the employer would be deprived of the cost of the call. Id. More
importantly, however, the government noted that prosecutors are unlikely to waste
resources by pursuing such a trivial offense, despite legal authority to do so. Id. In a
footnote, the government supported this assertion by noting that although § 1346 was
enacted almost fourteen years ago, the panel did not cite to one prosecution for
conduct where the risk of harm was de minimis. Government Brief at 52-53 & n.2,
Rybicki II (No. 00-1043).
Although this Note focuses on the problems of honest services prosecutions in
the private sector, there is an important public sector implication of Rybicki I worth
noting. One consequence of imposing a reasonably foreseeable harm requirement is
that public corruption cases may be placed outside the reach of § 1346. See Strassberg
& Braceras, supra note 122. This is because in many of the public corruption cases
the public officials that improperly benefit from their positions do so without the
"state victim" being foreseeably exposed to economic harm. See id. In light of the fact
that the honest services doctrine was originally implemented to prosecute just this
behavior, it remains to be seen how these types of cases will fare under Rybicki I's
analysis. Id.
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vague. 145 The in banc panel, in a 7-4 vote, concluded that § 1346 is not
unconstitutionally vague. 46 Notably, the in banc panel addressed
their prior holding in Handakas, determined that there was no reason
to reach the constitutional question in that case, and overruled the
unnecessary constitutional ruling without review of the merits.147
The in banc panel also addressed and rejected the adoption of the
reasonable foreseeability test and de minimis harm requirement set
forth in Rybicki I, preferring the materiality test 148 adopted by the
Fifth, Tenth, and Eighth Circuits. 149 In justifying this choice, the in
banc court wrote that:
it has the virtue of arising out of fundamental principles of the law of
fraud: A material misrepresentation is an element of the crime. The
'non-de minimis reasonably foreseeable harm' test, by contrast,
145. See Rybicki II, 2003 WL 23018917, at *1. The original panel considered and
rejected the defendant's argument that § 1346 was unconstitutionally vague as
applied, but the court could not consider the facial unconstitutionality because the
defendant's challenge was not based upon an impact on their First Amendment rights.
Id. at *2. Since this is the only basis upon which such a challenge can be considered
under Second Circuit case law, the circuit court granted the defendant's petition for
rehearing in banc on this issue on July 3, 2002. Id. at *2-*3.
146. Id. at *4-*5, *12-*13. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1346, "together with
section 1341 or section 1343, provides explicit standards for those who seek to apply
the statute, including federal prosecutors and courts, at least in the context of private-
sector bribery cases such as this one," id. at *5, and that "the statute is not
unconstitutional on its face," id. at *13.
147. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the in banc panel found that:
[I]t is clear that the defendant's conduct in that case was not within the scope
of behavior proscribed by section 1346: Handakas was not an employee of a
private entity purporting to act for and in the interests of his or her
employer; neither was he rendering services in which the relationship
between him and the person to whom the service was rendered gave rise to a
duty of loyalty comparable to that owed by employees to employers. His
actions therefore did not come within the reach of section 1346.... Because
we conclude that Handakas's conduct was not within the scope of section
1346, we have no occasion to conclude, as the Handakas panel did, that "the
intangible right to honest services" covered by section 1346 can never arise
in that context.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Judge Reena Raggi, in a special concurrence,
addressed the majority's Handakas analysis. Id. at *22-*23 (Raggi, J., concurring).
Judge Raggi would have defined the right to honest services more broadly as any
"legally enforceable claim to have another person provide labor, skill, or advice
without fraud or deception," id. at *21, and further questioned whether there was
"any principled reason to distinguish between an employee and an arms-length
contractor when they engage in identical fraud schemes with the specific intent to
deprive a victim of services whose value depends upon honest performance," id. at
*23 (Raggi, J., concurring); see also Richman & Vinegrad, supra note 10.
148. Under the materiality test, "the trier of fact determines whether the
misrepresentation 'has the natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing
the employer to change his behavior."' Id. at *14 (quoting United States v. Vinyard,
266 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir. 2001)).
149. Id. at *14.
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seems to be something of an ipse dixit designed simply to limit the
scope of section 1346.110
The in banc panel also expected the materiality test to cover cases
intended to be covered by the reasonably foreseeable harm test.151
This view of the materiality test also purportedly captures the de
minimis requirement in a somewhat broader way: "It may capture
some cases of non-economic, yet serious, harm in the private
sphere." '152
The implications of Rybicki II remain to be seen, but commentators
argue that the decision is "unlikely to open the proverbial floodgates
to criminal prosecution of trivial deceits or fiduciary breaches." '53 The
decision does, however, contribute to the "potpourri of seemingly
irreconcilable precedents,1' 5 4 that create confusion and disagreement
about the scope of the mail fraud intangible rights doctrine in the
private sector.
C. A Survey of the Circuits' Analytical Framework
Courts continue to struggle with different bright line tests,
illustrated in cases like Rybicki II, instead of focusing on the broader
limitations they already impose in different types of mail fraud cases,
because their analyses are often not sensitive to the facts of each case.
For example, the Fourth Circuit's framework in United States v.
Vinyard 55 illustrates such an approach. The court outlined the scope
of § 1346 as a circuit split and addressed two separate tests, the
materiality test and the reasonably foreseeable harm test. 15 6  In
outlining the reasonably foreseeable harm test, the court relied on five
cases. 57 Each of the five cases involved a failure to disclose where a
duty to disclose arises. 58 In outlining the materiality test, the court
150. Id. at *15 (internal citations omitted).
151. Id.
152. Id. It is interesting to note that while the panel claims, "We doubt that the
failure to disclose to an employer a de minimis 'bribe'-the free telephone call,
luncheon invitation, or modest Christmas present-is a material misrepresentation in
the sense in which we and other Circuits use the term," id. at *15, the panel offered no
explanation or justification in the legislative history that Congress intended to exclude
such bribes.
153. See Richman & Vinegrad, supra note 10.
154. Id.
155. 266 F.3d 320,327 (4th Cir. 2001).
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997), United
States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2000), United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d
1324, 1328-30 (11th Cir. 1999), United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138
F.3d 961, 973-74 (D.C. Cir. 1998), United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1337 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)).
158. See Martin, 228 F.3d at 17; deVegter, 198 F.3d at 1328-30; Sun-Diamond
Growers, 138 F.3d at 973-74; Frost, 125 F.3d at 368; Lemire, 720 F.2d at 1337.
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cited three cases. 159  Although two of these involved a failure to
disclose where a duty to disclose arises, both did have some significant
element of affirmative misrepresentation 6 ' and one involved only an
affirmative, material misrepresentation. 6' By failing to recognize that
the different tests were being applied to different types of cases, the
Fourth Circuit, like others, 62 has unnecessarily created an impression
of this circuit split'63 and the false sense of need for one bright line
test.
In analyzing pre-McNally case law, the in banc panel in Rybicki H
utilized a framework similar to the one being proposed in this Note."6
There, cases were divided into one of two categories.'65 In "The
Bribery or Kickback Cases," a defendant "who ha[d] or [sought] some
sort of business relationship or transaction with the victim secretly
[paid] the victim's employee (or causes such a payment to be made) in
exchange for favored treatment."'66 In "The Self Dealing Cases" the
"defendant typically cause[d] his or her employer to do business with
a corporation or other enterprise in which the defendant ha[d] a secret
interest, undisclosed to the employer."'67  The primary difference
between the Second Circuit's approach and this Note's analysis
centers on dividing the paradigmatic cases by looking at the duty
owed by the defendant and the specific way in which the defendant
did (or did not) breach the duty owed. The divisions in Rybicki II
draw a somewhat more superficial distinction based only on the
nature of the deceitful action."6
Structuring its analysis of pre-McNally case law by recognizing that
there are two distinct types of honest services cases in the private
sector was a step in the right direction. Although the Rybicki H in
banc panel stopped short of applying a similar framework to its
analysis of cases post- § 1346, and ultimately adopted one of the very
bright line tests that is critiqued here,'169 its framework is an optimistic
sign, and tacit recognition, at least, that similar categorical divisions
are important to any honest services analysis. As demonstrated
above, the divergent circuit approaches have done little to quell
159. Vinyard, 266 F.3d at 327 (citing United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 667
(10th Cir. 1997), United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 1999),
United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 775 (5th Cir. 1996)).
160. See Pennington, 168 F.3d at 1065; Gray, 96 F.3d at 775.
161. Cochran, 109 F.3d at 667.
162. See, e.g, Rybicki I, 287 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2002).
163. See supra Part H.A.-B. for a more detailed examination of this circuit split.
164. Rybicki H, No. 00-1043, 2003 WL 23018917, at *9-*11 (2d Cir. Dec. 29, 2003)
(in banc).
165. Id. at *9.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *10.
168. See id. at *23 (Raggi, J., concurring) (noting that the "critical factor is the type
of service at issue, not the relationship of the parties").
169. See id. at *14-*15; see also supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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criticisms of the reach of the intangible rights doctrine in the private
sector. Rather, they create more confusion, while providing the
illusion of clearly marked limits and well-defined boundaries.
III. COURTS IMPLICITLY LIMIT THE HONEST SERVICES DOCTRINE
AND SHOULD ABANDON THEIR SEARCH FOR A BRIGHT LINE TEST
A. An Overview
The circuit courts' search for a bright line test undermines the way
in which consideration of certain factors allows courts and prosecutors
to effectively limit mail fraud. An approach explicitly rooted in a
group of commonly used factors would obviate the need for recourse
to the diverse and misleading tests that dominate the mail fraud
opinions. The Second Circuit's attempts to limit the reach of § 1346
highlight the problems with the way the courts have been structuring
their analyses. By comparing and contrasting these bright line rules to
try to find the "best" one, courts ignore the reality of these cases.
Thus, Part III argues that the courts, despite their conception of what
specific test they apply, are all considering the same factors when they
decide whether a particular breach constitutes a deprivation of a right
to honest services, and that this deliberative, case-by-case approach is
superior to one bright line test.
An examination of relevant case law reveals that the type of case
involved determines how courts weigh various factors. These factors
themselves limit the scope of § 1346, while preserving the malleability
of the statute and providing prosecutors and judges the discretion
necessary to prevent prosecution of everyday breaches of contract or
relational duties that seem to trouble the courts. With this reality
exposed, courts, prosecutors, defendants and the public are best
served by abandoning the search, at least by the judiciary, for one
bright line test.
Specifically, depending on the facts of each case, courts consider:
(1) whether there was a fiduciary (or principal-agent) relationship; 7 '
(2) whether a failure to disclose was material;171 (3) whether there was
an affirmative misrepresentation;7 2 (4) whether the affirmative
misrepresentation was material;1 3 (5) whether the defendant
personally gained anything from the scheme; 174 and (6) whether
economic harm was reasonably foreseeable.175
170. See, e.g., United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 2003).
171. See, e.g., Rybicki II, No. 00-1043, 2003 WL 23018917, at *15 (2d Cir. Dec. 29,
2003).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1038 (8th Cir. 2000).
173. See, e.g., id.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Serafino, 281 F.3d 327, 331 (1st Cir. 2002).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2000); see also supra
note 108.
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In private sector honest fraud prosecutions-or at least those
reported cases in which judicial analysis has been developed-there
are two paradigmatic types of cases, each requiring a different
analysis. An effective analysis of the scope of § 1346 has to begin by
identifying these paradigms in order to see the effect of the various
factors in different types of cases. 176
In the first type of case, which is most often prosecuted under the
intangible rights theory in the private sector, there is a kickback
scheme and a failure to disclose in a relationship in which a duty to
disclose arises.177  In the second type of case, there is a kickback
scheme and an affirmative misrepresentation. 178  Of course, these
categories are not absolute, and often overlap.
B. Category One Cases
This section examines the first type of paradigmatic mail and wire
fraud cases and the factors that courts consider in such cases. In the
176. Section 1346 has been accused of being applied "to a broad range of fact
patterns having relatively little in common." Coffee, Metastasis, supra note 42, at 1.
By examining the "paradigmatic cases," this Note hopes to show that the use of §
1346 is not nearly as inappropriate, subjective, or vague as courts and commentators
suggest. The cases relied upon are solely those decided post-McNally that applied §
1346. There are many cases decided before McNally and those decided after, but
which refused to apply § 1346 ex post facto, could also be used to illustrate these
categories.
177. See, e.g, United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding
conviction where a lawyer referred personal injury clients to a chiropractor in return
for payments from that chiropractor); Serafino, 281 F.3d at 327 (upholding conviction
where an employee instructed employer's vendors to inflate various charges and
divert the surplus funds); United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2002)
(upholding conviction where a CEO failed to disclose material information to the
Board of Directors); United States v. Montani, 204 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2000)
(upholding conviction where defendant-employee made $300,000 from a kickback
scheme he failed to disclose); United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir.
1999) (upholding conviction where a corporate officer failed to disclose kickbacks he
was receiving from a hired consultant); United States v. Jordan, 112 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.
1997) (upholding conviction where defendant-employee charged employer-company
for services by another company he owned and violated company policy against
undisclosed outside business); United States v. Rosen, 130 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1997)
(upholding conviction where the defendant failed to disclose an employment
relationship designed to deprive a trustee of certain profits to be redirected towards
himself). Contra United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1077 (1st Cir. 1997)
(reversing conviction based on defendant's unauthorized accessing of confidential tax
information where there was no showing that the defendant intended to disclose or
otherwise use the confidential information for personal gain).
178. See United States v. Piggie, 316 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2003) (where a defendant
paid athletes to play for his team and the athletes made false statements to their
respective universities); United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2000) (where
defendants diverted funds from their client's impounded tax funds while indicating to
the clients these monies had been properly forwarded to the IRS); see also United
States v. Sancho, 157 F.3d 918 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277
(2d Cir. 1996) (involving affirmative misrepresentations to obtain a loan); supra note
129 and accompanying text.
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first category of cases ("Category One cases"), a defendant engages in
or devises a kickback scheme and fails to disclose the existence of that
scheme despite a duty to disclose, because the defendant has a
fiduciary duty of loyalty to another. These types of relationships
include, but are not limited to: employer-employee; lawyer-client;
doctor-patient; and corporation-corporate officer.
In these types of cases, courts focus on a particular subset of factors.
First, the courts consider whether there was a relationship that gave
rise to a duty to disclose. 17 9 Next, courts look at whether the
information that was not disclosed was material.80 Finally, the courts
consider whether the defendant personally gained, or potentially
stood to gain, anything from the scheme.' There need not have been
an affirmative misrepresentation, and whether or not economic harm
was reasonably foreseeable to the victim is irrelevant,'82 because this
category of cases deals with secret self-dealing and misuse of positions
of trust and loyalty for personal gain, cases within the core of the
honest services doctrine.'83 A mere breach of a fiduciary duty or duty
of loyalty may not be sufficient to sustain a mail fraud conviction
under § 1346.14 To sustain a mail fraud conviction in this line of cases,
the defendant must cause or intend to cause actual harm, and this
intent can be inferred from willful non-disclosure of material
information by a fiduciary.1 85
An examination of cases falling within Category One reveals a
consistency in courts' analyses in considering the appropriate factors.
For example, the Seventh Circuit upheld a mail fraud conviction when
a personal injury lawyer received kickbacks from a chiropractor to
whom he referred his clients.8 6 The defendant-lawyer referred his
179. See Hausmann, 345 F.3d at 952; Serafino, 281 F.3d at 327; Montani, 204 F.3d at
761; Pennington, 168 F.3d at 1060.
180. See Hausmann, 345 F.3d at 952; Serafino, 281 F.3d at 327; Montani, 204 F.3d at
761; Pennington, 168 F.3d at 1060.
181. See Hausmann, 345 F.3d at 952; Serafino, 281 F.3d at 327; Montani, 204 F.3d at
761; Pennington, 168 F.3d at 1060.
182. Even if no economic harm is reasonably foreseeable, when a person misuses a
fiduciary duty owed to another for personal gain, and does not disclose the scheme,
the fact of the non-disclosure is material and the victim necessarily loses his/her right
to honest services. See Hausmann, 345 F.3d at 958. This might not be the case where
a fiduciary duty is breached, but the defendant does not gain anything from that
breach, because the intent element will not be satisfied.
183. See id. at 952; Serafino, 281 F.3d at 327; Montani, 204 F.3d at 761; Pennington,
168 F.3d at 1060.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting
that although the plain language of § 1346 suggests that dishonesty by any employee,
standing alone is a crime, courts are reluctant to interpret the statute that broadly and
hesitate to "apply [it] in a way that would expose employees to mail fraud prosecution
for 'every breach of contract or every misstatement made in the course of dealing"'
(internal citations omitted)); Pennington, 168 F.3d at 1065.
185. Vinyard, 266 F.3d at 326-27 (noting that in most business contexts, the
intended harm is usually financial or economic harm).
186. Hausmann, 345 F.3d at 952, 954.
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clients to the chiropractor, and, in return, the chiropractor would
make payments to the defendant personally or to third parties at the
defendant's direction. 18 7 The chiropractor was paid out of the client's
portion of a settlement after the defendant-lawyer had already
received his fees.188 The defendant argued that the chiropractor's fees
were competitive, that the clients received an appropriate level of
care, and that the clients were not entitled to the portion of the
chiropractor's fees paid back to the defendant. 189 As such, the clients
suffered no harm from the scheme.' 9 The court rejected both of these
arguments. 191 Although the court expressed its doubts as to whether a
mail fraud prosecution could be sustained under an intangible rights
theory that alleges only a breach of fiduciary duty and nothing more,
it held that when there is a misuse or breach of that fiduciary
relationship for personal gain, the defendant has breached his duty of
honest services to those to whom the duty was owed.'92
This conclusion makes sense. The chiropractor was kicking 20
percent of his fees back to the defendant.' 93 The mere fact that the
clients received the same services they would have absent the
kickback scheme ignores the reality that if the chiropractor was
willing to perform absent that 20 percent, that is 20 percent of the fees
that the clients-not the defendant-lawyer-were entitled to.' 94 By
considering the personal gain to the defendant, coupled with the
breach of fiduciary duty, the court correctly upheld the mail fraud
conviction without forcing the prosecution to prove exactly where the
loss lay.
The First Circuit implicitly considered defendant non-disclosure,
the duty to disclose, and personal gain to the defendant in upholding
an honest services conviction in United States v. Serafino.95 There,
defendant-employee of Milton Bradley Company ("MBC") instructed
vendors to inflate various charges on their invoices to MBC and divert
the surplus funds to the defendant.' 96 The defendant never disclosed
this scheme to MBC, despite a company policy that required him to
do so.1 97 The defendant argued that he had no control over MBC's
decision to do business with those vendors, and that despite the
inflated value, MBC was supposedly happy with the services provided
because they continued their business relationships with those
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 957.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 956.
193. Id. at 957.
194. Id.
195. 281 F.3d 327 (1st Cir. 2002).
196. Id. at 329.
197. Id.
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vendors.19 Relying on the fact that the defendant had a duty to
disclose the kickback scheme and failed to do so coupled with his
personal gain of over $800,000, the court upheld the conviction.199
Similarly, other circuits have properly considered, either explicitly
or implicitly, this same subset of factors in analyzing honest services
convictions where there was a failure to disclose (despite the existence
of a duty to disclose) and the defendant gained from that non-
disclosure.200
198. See id. at 332.
199. See id. at 329, 332-33.
200. The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Pennington, upheld the honest services
conviction of a defendant who engaged in a kickback scheme. 168 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir.
1999). The defendant had a duty to disclose his scheme and failed to do so, and
personally benefited as a result of that scheme. See id. at 1065. There, the defendant
was the President of Harvest Foods, a grocery store chain. Id. at 1063. He received
secret payments from a consultant and food broker based on monies they received
from Harvest Foods. Id. at 1063-64. The defendant argued that Harvest Foods
actually benefited from the contracts negotiated by and services provided by the
consultant and food broker. Id. at 1065. In rejecting this argument the court noted
the defendant's fiduciary duty to Harvest Foods, and held that a reasonable jury could
infer that the defendant deprived Harvest Foods of his honest services in finding the
most advantageous supplier and negotiating the best contracts he could. Id. The court
implicitly considered the tremendous financial gain to the defendant as a result of the
scheme. See id. at 1065-66.
Another case, United States v. Montani, nicely highlights the application of this
factor analysis structure. 204 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2000). There, the defendant was an
employee of Sears. Id. at 763. As part of standard company practice, the defendant
agreed to abide by the company's code of business ethics, which prohibited, inter alia,
self-dealing transactions. Id. The defendant became the national manager of logistics
and was instructed to sell off, at the best possible price, furniture that Sears could not
or did not want to sell in its own stores or catalog. Id. at 763-64. After researching the
market, the defendant concluded that the best price Sears could get would be
between 7 cents and 10 cents on the dollar of the original cost to Sears. Id. at 764.
The defendant received approval to sell the furniture at 10 cents on the dollar. Id.
The defendant met a man named Mark Israel, who subsequently formed a company,
D&M Sales, and agreed to buy the furniture at 10 percent of cost. Id. D&M reached
an agreement to resell the furniture to another company, Brutus, for fifty cents on the
dollar, and the defendant received a payment, disguised as a bogus consulting fee, for
part of the profit earned on the sale to Brutus. Id. at 764. The defendant made over
$300,000 as a result of this scheme. Id. at 765.
The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to show that the
defendant deprived Sears of its right to his honest services by failing to disclose the
payment to them and in fact, by undertaking steps to conceal the payment. Id. at 769.
Although Sears did not lose money in the sense that they received the supposed
market price, the defendant deprived Sears of premiums he was getting through the
resale scheme. See id. at 763-65. Moreover, this non-disclosure enabled the defendant
to accrue significant profit. Id. at 769. Standing alone, a conviction solely based on
the breach of an employee manual might not be enough. But coupled with the
personal gain to the defendant, the relevant factors led, to what many agree is a just
result, and well within the core of honest services cases. See id.
The Second Circuit case, United States v. Walker, also provides an interesting
example of a Category One paradigm. 191 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 1999). The defendant
operated a small law firm specializing in immigration work. Id. at 330. An INS
investigation revealed that many of the applications filed by the defendant,
presumably on behalf of his clients, were substantially similar and contained
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C. Category Two Cases
In the second category of paradigmatic cases ("Category Two
cases"), consideration of another set of factors is appropriate. In cases
where there is a kickback scheme and an affirmative
misrepresentation, the government need not establish a fiduciary
relationship, a duty to disclose information, or whether the defendant
personally gained anything from the scheme.2 °1 Instead, the factors
that courts do, and should, consider in this second type of cases are
whether there was an affirmative misrepresentation, whether that
misrepresentation was material (which necessarily includes an analysis
of whether harm was reasonably foreseeable), and whether the
scheme was intended for or did result in personal gain to the
defendant. Because there is no fiduciary relationship, a non-
disclosure is not sufficient, unless it amounts to an affirmative,
material misrepresentation.
A good illustration of how these factors operate in Category Two
cases is found in United States v. Ervasti.2 2 There, the two defendants
owned and operated Corporate Financial Services ("CFS"), a
company offering payroll processing services to employers.0 3 CFS
received tax monies that its clients, the employers, were required by
law to withhold from their employees' pay.2° The defendants then
were responsible for preparing and filing their client's tax returns and
making timely payments to the IRS.2"5 The defendants opened a tax
account into which the impounded tax funds were deposited. 26 The
defendants then improperly took funds from this account to use for
operating expenses. 207  Eventually, CFS lacked adequate capital to
meet its expenses and the defendants' practice of borrowing money
from the tax account stretched past the date the impounded money
fabricated information. Id. at 330-31. The defendant challenged his mail fraud
conviction, arguing that for the most part, his clients "received the results they were
seeking." Id. at 334. The court disagreed and determined that the defendant deprived
his clients of their intangible right to his honest services because he "exacted legal
fees from his clients by submitting false asylum applications on their behalf, regardless
of the clients' actual intentions or legal needs" and did "not [tell] them material
information, information that might have led them to walk out of the office and not
pay their fee." Id. at 335. Thus, the court upheld the intangible rights mail fraud
conviction, in light of specific factors-fiduciary relationship, non-disclosure of
material information, and gain to the defendant in the form of substantial legal fees-
without employing any bright line test. See id.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769 (5th Cir.
1996).
202. 201 F.3d at 1029.
203. Id. at 1033.
204. Id. at 1032-34.
205. Id. at 1032-33.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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was due to the IRS.28  The defendants told their clients that the
money due had been timely deposited, when the money had not.209
The Eighth Circuit upheld the mail fraud conviction in Ervasti,
based on an honest services theory, finding unequivocally that the
government need not prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship.2"0
In doing so, the court implicitly considered the affirmative
misrepresentation the defendants made to their clients, that the IRS
payments had been made on time.211 This misrepresentation was a
material one, as its goes to the very purpose that CFS had been hired
for. Although the defendants did not personally gain from the fraud
(in fact, they lost a tremendous amount of money), it was enough that
the money they had been taking from the tax account was used to
meet the operating expenses of CFS, thus benefiting the defendants,
albeit temporarily. 212 It was also reasonably foreseeable that the
clients could suffer economic harm from the defendants'
misrepresentations.1 3
Some private sector honest services mail fraud cases have an
element of a fiduciary relationship, but to the courts, the dispositive
factors were the affirmative, material misrepresentations, and this
focus brings these cases under the umbrella of Category Two. 14 For
example, in United States v. Gray,1 5 the Fifth Circuit upheld the mail
and wire fraud convictions of the men's basketball coaching staff at
Baylor University, among others, who devised a fraudulent scheme to
establish academic eligibility for five athletes to play on the team.216
The defendants provided five players, recruited from two-year
colleges, with written coursework and answers to correspondence
exams.217 Upon reviewing the convictions, the court found that the
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1032-34. This case is especially interesting because there was, at
minimum, the existence of a duty of loyalty to the clients, suggesting it is better
identified as a Category One case. The court, however, focused on the fact that §
1346 does not require proof of a fiduciary relationship, so assuming there was not one
here, this case fits squarely into Category Two. There was also cognizable financial
harm to the clients, resulting from IRS tax penalties. This Note focuses, however,
only on the portion of the prosecution involving an honest services theory. Facts
cannot be examined in a vacuum though, and it is important to recognize that the
court may have had both of these factors in mind in upholding the conviction.
210. Id. at 1036 (noting that although the existence of a fiduciary duty can be a
powerful indication that a defendant has deprived another of the right to honest
services, the existence of such a relationship is not a necessary element under § 1346).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Id. at 1037.
214. See United States v. Easton, 54 Fed. Appx. 242 (8th Cir. 2002) (unpublished)
(per curiam); United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Gray, 96 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996).
215. 96 F.3d at 769.
216. Id. at 772, 777.
217. Id. at 772.
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coaches deprived Baylor of its intangible rights to their honest
services .218 The court focused on the materiality of the non-disclosure
of the scheme, as well as on the fact that the scheme went beyond
non-disclosure to an employer; the defendants made affirmative
misrepresentations to the universities.2 19  Finally, the court rejected
the defendants' contention that their scheme did not, and was not
intended to, result in either gain to them or harm to Baylor.2 ° In fact,
Baylor's success as a basketball team would have benefited the
coaches; one of the defendant coaches actually received his coaching
position as a direct result of his recruitment efforts.2 2 ' Thus, the
affirmative, material misrepresentations, coupled with the coaches'
assured benefit from a successful scheme, satisfied the court that
honest services convictions here were appropriate.
Another case, United States v. Caldwell,222 contains elements of both
Category One and Category Two cases.223 There, the defendant failed
to disclose material information and made material
misrepresentations intended for his own benefit. 224  The Court
concluded that the several instances of omissions and false
representations "involving significant sums of money and important
218. Id. at 774.
219. See, id. at 774-76. To some extent, the court also discussed the fact that the
coaches were employees who owed a fiduciary duty to the employer-University. Id.
Because, however, the non-disclosures referred to by the court were really affirmative
misrepresentations, this case is more appropriately labeled a Category Two case.
220. Id. at 776 n.10.
221. Id.
222. United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2002).
223. Sometimes cases involving fiduciary duties are more effectively considered
solely under Category Two because they involve affirmative misrepresentations that
make the existence of the fiduciary duty almost irrelevant to the analysis; the
misrepresentation obviates the need to apply a failure to disclose analysis. United
States v. Easton, 54 Fed. Appx. 242 (8th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (per curium),
presents such an example. There, the defendant and another Gateway employee
established a partnership in their wives' maiden names, to circumvent Gateway's
policy not to do business with its employees. Id. at 243. The defendant falsely claimed
shipments had been received from this fake partnership, and Gateway paid those
claims. Id. The defendant then paid its vendor and the prepaid materials were sent to
Gateway, resulting in almost $220,000 to the defendant and his colleagues. Id. The
court upheld the conviction without requiring the government to prove that Gateway
suffered any harm, on the basis that the misrepresentations and personal gain were
sufficient to establish intent to defraud. See id.
224. See Caldwell, 302 F.3d at 401-05. The defendant played a large role in
advocating the passage of the Venture Capital Act. Id. at 402. In advocating the Act's
passage, the defendant represented himself as being associated with Capital Strategies
Group ("CSG"), a company he formed and wholly owned. Id. at 402. The Venture
Capital Act formed three entities, including Magnolia Venture Capital Corp.
("Magnolia Venture"), in which the defendant sat on the board of directors, and held
the position of chairman. Id. The defendant made various misrepresentations to the
board while urging them to approve contracts between CSG and Magnolia Venture,
as well as making certain unauthorized assurances to investors. Id. at 402-05. Internal
investigation concluded that the defendant had acted in the best interest of CSG, not
Magnolia Venture. Id. at 405.
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business decisions" warranted an inference of materiality, especially in
light of the personal gain the defendant's scheme intended. 225  The
court here did not rely on any one test. Rather, it considered factors
such as fiduciary relationship, non-disclosure, materiality, self-dealing,
and affirmative misrepresentation to conclude that the defendant's
honest services conviction was proper.
D. Policy Considerations
This section argues that the factors that courts consider226 in each
category of cases properly reflect the public policy goals of § 1346.
For purposes of judicial interpretation, one of the leading policy
concerns must be congressional intent. While § 1346 was being
debated in Congress, there was little resistance to including private
corruption within the statute's scope. 227  This debate indicates that
kickback cases in the private sector are exactly the type of case that
Congress intended the statute to cover.228
At one time, there was a proposal for two separate honest services
statutes; one dealing with the private sector229 and one dealing with
the public sector.23° Senator Biden's comments, with respect to the
private sector proposal, are most instructive:
225. See, id. at 409-10. These omissions and misrepresentations included (1)
defendant's promise to an investor that he could withdraw part of his investment to
satisfy his tax liability, (2) defendant's payment to himself of $225,000 drawn from the
Magnolia fund, (3) his direction to pay a third party a certain percentage of Magnolia
Venture's profits each month, (4) defendant's misrepresentation to the board that he
only co-owned CSG, (5) defendant's false representation that the governing board
approved of his relationship with CSG and Magnolia Venture, (6) defendant's
misrepresentation that CSG was the only firm Magnolia Venture could hire for a
certain purpose, and (7) defendant's misrepresentation that CSG incurred $14,000 in
expenses that it did not in fact incur. Id.
226. See supra Part III.A. for a discussion of these factors.
227. Government's Brief at 40, Rybicki II, No. 00-1043, 2003 WL 23018917 (2d Cir.
Dec. 29, 2003).
228. See infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
229. That statute would have defined "scheme or artifice to defraud" for the
purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes as including:
a scheme or artifice to deprive an organization of the intangible right of
honest services in which the defendant received or attempted to receive, for
the defendant or another person, anything of value or in which the
defendant intended or contemplated loss or harm to the organization.
134 Cong. Rec. S12581-04 (daily ed. Sept. 15 1988), 1988 WL 185718, at § 3.
230. The bill addressing only public sector corruption, the "Mail Fraud
Amendment Act of 1987," was introduced by Representative Mfume on July 29, 1987.
That bill provided, as applied to § 1341 and § 1343:
the term "defraud" to include the defrauding of the citizens of a body politic
of their right to the conscientious, loyal, faithful, and unbiased performance
of official duties by a public official thereof; or of their right to have the
public business conducted honestly, impartially, free from bribery,
corruption, bias, dishonesty, deceit, official misconduct, and fraud.
133 Cong. Rec H 6798 (July 29, 1987).
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[T]he codification of the intangible rights doctrine is intended to
allow the government to prosecute persons who violate the trust
placed in them by their employers or some other organization and
do so in order to get a bribe or kickback.... This is intended to
permit prosecution of the kinds of cases that [were] approved by the
appellate courts before McNally. It is not intended to criminalize
mere breaches of fiduciary duty, or private confidence, or violations
[of] ordinary rules of the workplace. Indeed, although the
committee is aware of no such cases having been prosecuted before
McNally under the intangible rights doctrine, in response to
academic comment that such a result might someday occur, the
codification of pre-McNally law in the bill is specifically limited to
situations where the defendant is acting to obtain a thing of value, or
to harm the organization. This provision will foreclose the abuse of
the statute to prosecute trivial, noncriminal matters.2 31
Senator Biden added that "this is a bipartisan bill that has the
unanimous support of the members of the Judiciary Committee, 232
and every speaker but one advocated passage of the legislation. 33
Although this proposal was eventually redacted down to what is now
the language of § 1346, no formal explanation for this redaction is
contained in the record.2 34  Representative Conyers expressed that
"loss of property is not what is to be feared most. Abuse of trust in an
interdependent society-whether of governmental character or
otherwise-is far more threatening to our most basic and important
values. 235 This legislative history is probative, however, of the fact
that the courts are being consistent with legislative intent when they
evaluate § 1346 cases by considering the factors discussed above.
Another important policy consideration is balancing the flexibility23 6
of § 1346 with the need to prevent over-criminalization. Maintaining
the flexibility of the mail and wire fraud statutes is important because
it serves as a way for prosecutors to punish conduct that could not
readily be charged under other statutes. 237  The mail fraud statute
231. 134 Cong. Rec. S16315-01, 1988 WL 177972 (Oct. 14,1988) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Government's Brief at 42, Rybicki II (No. 00-1043).
235. H.R. 3089, 100th Cong. (1st Sess. 1987), § 2, reprinted in 133 Cong. Rec.
E3240-02 (Aug. 4, 1987).
236. See Williams, supra note 23, at 137 n.4 (1990) (collecting cases demonstrating
the wide range of activities that have been prosecuted by the mail fraud statute).
237. Mogin, supra note 19, at 13; see also John C. Coffee Jr. & Charles K.
Whitehead, The Federalization of Fraud: Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes, in White
Collar Crime: Business and Regulatory Offenses § 9.01 at 9-2 (Otto G. Obermaier &
Robert G. Morvillo eds., 1990) (Federal prosecutors have long followed the maxim,
"[w]hen in doubt, charge mail fraud."); Behrens, supra note 7, at 526 n.266 (citing
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 407 (1974),
which argued that the scope of the mail fraud statute must be kept broad and "remain
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serves as "a stopgap device" to deal on a temporary basis with the new
phenomenon, "until particularized legislation can be developed and
passed to deal directly with the evil. ' 238 Chief Justice Warren Burger
endorsed it as a "first line of defense" in many new forms of private
sector fraud.239  Moreover, this malleability releases federal
prosecutors from the often-technical jurisdictional requirements
found in other federal fraud statutes.24 Bright line rules, like those
suggested in Rybicki I, threaten the very flexibility that the mail fraud
statute is lauded for.4
Courts must exercise caution, however, so as not to over-criminalize
behavior. 242 Over-criminalization refers to the excessive reliance on a
criminal sanction, especially with malum prohibitum 243 types of
crimes.2 " There must be a limit at which the law can legitimately
punish behavior, lest we live in an over-regulated society,245 where the
law intrudes to places that are "not the law's business. ' 246  Over-
criminalization results in "[i]ncreased disrespect for the law,
strong to be able to cope with the new varieties of fraud that the ever-inventive
American 'con-artist' is sure to develop."
238. Mogin, supra note 19, at 13; see also Cutler, supra note 90, at 93. Cutler noted
that "[f]or the federal prosecutor, the capability to indict under alternate clauses of
the mail fraud statute is a powerful tool. As efforts to prosecute mail fraud are
stepped up, newer frauds will emerge as more devious schemes are employed to
cheat." Id.
239. Maze, 414 U.S. at 405-06 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see Cutler, supra note 90,
at 94-95. Cutler noted:
Fraud, by its nature, adapts and changes. Fraud is chameleon-like, altering
its appearance to the hopes and expectations of a naive public. As criminals
become more creative, prosecutors need a pliable instrument to implement
the law. The mail fraud statute has provided that tool, allowing prosecutors
to delve into the fray armed with broad statutory mandates and expansive
judicial directives.
Id. But see Rybicki II, No. 00-1043, 2003 WL 23018917, at *9 (2d Cir. Dec. 29, 203)
(noting that there is "no reason to think that Congress sought to grant carte blanche
to federal prosecutors, judges and juries to define 'honest services' from case to case
for themselves").
240. Henning, supra note 39, at 437 n.12 ("Other broad federal criminal law
provisions require proof of specific activities as an element of the offense, in addition
to proof of the underlying harm.").
241. See supra notes 132-71 and accompanying text.
242. See Coffee, supra note 89, at 234-38.
243. Malum prohibitum refers to "[a]n act that is a crime merely because it is
prohibited by statute, although the act itself is not necessarily immoral.
Misdemeanors such as jaywalking and running a stoplight are mala prohibita, as are
many regulatory violations." Blacks Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999).
244. See Coffee, supra note 89, at 200-01.
245. There are greater economic risks in the corporate world. See Ezersky, supra
note 7, at 1438-39 ("The heightened possibility of liability.... for business failure or
suspect loyalty is likely to magnify the already excessive risk-aversion of corporate
managers-or cause them to demand increased compensation to offset this risk of
criminal liability-and thereby reduce returns to shareholders.").
246. See Landis Cox, Targeting Sports Agents with the Mail Fraud Statute: United
States v. Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom, 41 Duke L.J. 1157, 1203-04 (1991-92)
(footnotes omitted).
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discriminatory enforcement, and waste of judicial resources. ' 24 1
Furthermore, if criminal law is overused, it will lose its "distinctive
stigma. '24s  The proper balance between flexibility and over-
criminalization is struck by the analysis already being employed by the
courts; consideration of appropriate factors in certain types of cases
that fall within the core of § 1346. Analyses based on these factors
preserve the flexibility of the honest services doctrine to adapt to new
types of fraud not addressed by specific statute, yet, in practice,
prevent its use for trivial prosecutions.249 Moreover, the United States
Attorney's Manual instructs prosecutors to exercise discretion when
deciding whether or not to pursue a mail or wire fraud prosecution.25 °
As noted by the Handakas court, proper notice of wrongdoing is an
important policy element, indeed a constitutional requirement, as an
"indefinite criminal statute creates opportunity for the misuse of
247. Id.
248. Coffee, supra note 89, at 197.
249. The Handakas court expressed its concern regarding over-criminalization:
If the 'honest services' clause can be used to punish a failure to honor [an
organization's] insistence on the payment of prevailing rate of wages, it
could make a criminal out of anyone who breaches any contractual
representation: that tuna was netted dolphin-free; that stationary is made of
recycled paper; that sneakers or T-shirts are not made by child workers; that
grapes are picked by union labor-in sum so called consumer protection law
and far more.
United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 2002). Although a mail fraud
prosecution would not be sustained in any of these cases, given the rubric employed
by courts and the factors they consider, this serves as an appropriate vehicle to
reiterate that just because a prosecutor can charge a crime does not mean that they
will. The fact that no such prosecution was cited by the Handakas court, suggests that
prosecutors are wisely and appropriately exercising their discretion, and are limiting
honest services prosecutions to ones in which there is a true scheme to defraud, such
as in cases involving kickbacks. See infra note 250.
250. The U.S. Attorney's Manual reads:
Prosecutions of fraud ordinarily should not be undertaken if the scheme
employed consists of some isolated transactions between individuals,
involving minor loss to the victims, in which case the parties should be left to
settle their differences by civil or criminal litigation in the state courts.
Serious consideration, however, should be given to the prosecution of any
scheme which in its nature is directed to defrauding a class of persons, or the
general public, with a substantial pattern of conduct.
United States Attorney Manual, tit. 9-43.100 (Prosecution Policy Relating to Mail
Fraud and Wire Fraud), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/43mcrm.htm. But see
Ezersky, supra note 7, at 1441-42. Ezersky pointed out that the open-ended nature of
the mail and wire fraud statutes may
tempt prosecutors to charge mail/wire fraud in lieu of the more difficult (and
more costly) to prove offense actually involved.., prosecutors add mail/wire
fraud counts as insurance when the primary charges rest on unsure
evidentiary footing.., the prosecutor can fall back on easy-to-prove
mail/wire fraud as a face-saving device when the primary counts are
weakened during the course of the trial.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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government power,, 251 and "[t]he plain meaning of 'honest services' in
the text of § 1346 simply provides no clue to the public or the courts as
to what conduct is prohibited under the statute., 25 2 Part of what
created this uncertainty, however, is judicially created standards that
draw arbitrary distinctions such as de minimis harm and tort/contract
enforceability.253 Overall, by consistently considering the same factors
for different types of cases, courts have created de facto notice of what
will constitute honest services mail fraud. 54 Moreover, as illustrated
by the cases discussed above, the kind of behavior being punished is
both consistent with the language of the statute and its history, and
sufficient to put anyone on notice that participating in a fraudulent
scheme, either in a fiduciary-agency relationship or through
affirmative, material misrepresentations, may result in criminal
255sanctions.
E. Bronston Revisited
It is useful to reexamine United States v. Bronston,256 the often-
criticized intangible rights decision, in light of the factors courts now
consistently (though not explicitly) consider. In Bronston, the Second
Circuit upheld a conviction where the defendant-lawyer pursued a
case despite a firm conflict 7.2  There was no actual misuse of the
fiduciary relationship beyond the existence of that conflict. 8 Would
the outcome be any different under this Note's proposed analysis? It
most likely would.
Although the defendant there had a duty to disclose the conflict and
the defendant failed to disclose the information to either his partners
or his clients,259 an intangible rights prosecution would be unlikely to
succeed under the factor-based analysis recommended in this Note.
There was no scheme designed to benefit the defendant or harm the
victim, and thus Bronston seems to be outside the core of honest
services cases to which the courts implicitly limit private sector
251. United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2002).
252. Id. at 104.
253. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
254. Judicial interpretation of statutes is one way notice of what a law prohibits is
given. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) ("[A]lithough clarity at the
requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, due
process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct
that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within
its scope." (citations omitted)).
255. See supra Parts III.B.-C.
256. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
257. Id.; see also supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
258. Id. at 922-26.
259. See id.
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prosecutions6.2  The Bronston case is missing that critical element of
Category One cases because the prosecution could not show either
intended harm to the victim or gain to the defendant.2 61 The money
that the defendant received was fair value compensation for work
performed, not a kickback or secret payment made in exchange for his
262representation. Moreover, there was no misuse of the defendant's
fiduciary position-merely a conflict in existence at the time that he
represented his client.2 63  In fact, Bronston seems to more closely
resemble more recent cases in which honest services mail fraud
convictions have been overturned than the cases where they have
been upheld.2 4
The problem with Bronston seems to be fraudulent intent.
Although this intent can often be inferred2 65 where the defendant has
caused actual or potential damage to the victims, or has himself
manipulated a position for actual or potential gain, an inference here
seems too large a leap.26
Without the element of self-dealing, a conviction seems to
contravene legislative intent,267 and a prosecution of all cases in which
a conflict of interests exists, without more, would be a tremendous
waste of federal judicial resources. 68 It seems as though the conduct
that prosecutors should be (and probably would be) most concerned
with is when conflicts of interest are intended for a gain or a loss,
though not necessarily both, as in Rybicki L One could argue,
260. In fact, the in banc panel in Rybicki II "interred Bronston in a footnote,"
giving it little weight even in the context of analyzing pre-McNally case law. See
Richman & Vinegrad, supra note 10.
261. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
262. See Bronston, 658 F.2d at 922-26.
263. See id.
264. See United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that
exaggerated market prices were insufficient to show a scheme to defraud,
acknowledging that "the line between unethical behavior and unlawful behavior is
sometimes blurred"); United States v. Goodman, 984 F.2d 235, 240 (8th Cir. 1993)
(distinguishing between legal and illegal promotion schemes, noting that "sleazy" and
"shrewd" practices, absent further evidence of fraudulent intent, were insufficient to
sustain a mail fraud conviction); see also United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2d
Cir. 2002) (notably not involving bribes, kickbacks, or other secret self-dealing).
265. See, e.g., United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir. 1993)
("Fraudulent intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances and need
not be proven by direct evidence."). But see Podgor, supra note 2 ("Prosecutors think
intent can always be inferred from the evidence and that just isn't so.").
266. See United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 668 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that
"in the absence of actual or potential harm, evidence independent of the alleged
scheme must be adduced to show fraudulent intent towards the alleged victims").
267. But see Ezersky, supra note 7, at 1431 (arguing that the conduct prohibited by
the mail and wire fraud statutes is "nothing more than an undisclosed breach of duty
by anyone labeled a fiduciary").
268. Of course, there are arguments that could be made for why a conviction would
be upheld in Bronston even today, and this Note does not exclude that possibility.
Rather, in reliance on recent trends and an examination of recent cases and their
facts, this Note suggests that an honest services conviction would be unlikely.
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however, that the undisclosed profits that the defendant in Bronston
kept from his partners did actual financial harm to those whom he
owed a fiduciary duty-but a prosecution would have to prove that
harm as an element of actual pecuniary fraud; there would be no
honest services conviction.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, courts may continue their search for a bright line test
absent further word from Congress. They need not, however,
continue towards such ends. Recent decisions, though purporting to
embrace explicit limits on the scope of the intangible rights doctrine in
the private sector, are more consistent and appropriate than courts
themselves are willing to recognize. Bright line tests come
dangerously close to circumventing the intent of Congress for a
flexible application of the mail fraud statute, and each test carries with
it more vague and arbitrary standards.
An examination of the facts of the cases illustrated in this Note
demonstrates that prosecutorial discretion is being appropriately
exercised and that the cases U.S. Attorneys are prosecuting are within
the appropriate bounds of honest services fraud as intended by
Congress; therefore, courts should abandon their search for decisive
tests and continue to ground their analyses in the factors they already
implicitly depend on, such as materiality, intended gain to the
defendant, and reasonable foreseeability of harm. Courts weighed
these factors appropriately depending on the type of case, and a body
of case law has developed which provides adequate notice to those
who engage in self-dealing that they may be subject to prosecution,
whether or not they cause harm to an identifiable victim. The courts
have "gotten it right" without even knowing it, and decisions such as
Rybicki I, Rybicki II and Handakas threaten that very achievement.
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